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Abstract
We study an OLG model in which heterogenous agents bargain over capital
taxation. In our model, both of the balance of bargaining power and threat point,
that standard median voter models have not considered, are endogenized. We
show that the two key features are crucial determinants for political as well as
economic outcomes.
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1 Introduction
Inequality is not just consequence of economic forces but policies also play their role
in the formation of inequality. Moreover, policies themselves reflect the will of the
people to some degree. The standard approach to illustrate this interaction is to sup-
pose that the median voter can choose his/her most preferred policy without any
negotiation (Meltzer and Richard, 1981). In the real democratic countries, however,
policies are chosen by bargaining among strategic legislators. This paper, apart from
the median voter approach, studies an overlapping generation(OLG) model where
consumers explicitly bargain over capital taxation. We show several crucial determi-
nants for political and economic outcomes in which the median voter models were
not taken into account.
⇤Graduate School of Economics, Sophia University, <yuta_saito@sophia.jp>.
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One of the key determinants is the balance of bargaining power among legislators1.
For example, the more share of conservative people in legislature might induces
lower tax as a result of voting. We endogenize the bargaining power assuming that
consumers can directly bargain over taxation, so the ideological distribution of leg-
islators is wealth distribution of consumers. This direct democracy setting makes the
model to capture the pure result without considering political frictions such as dis-
proportional election, political campaign, or rent-seeking legislators.
The other important element is the threat point (the utility from the default op-
tion). For instance, if the default option is always zero tax, it might strengthen the
power of rich who prefer lower tax. Although the median voter models have omit-
ted it, we endogenize the threat point by allowing the current policy to be a default
option tomorrow (status quo), so forward looking young consumers chose current
policy taking into account that it will be the status quo tomorrow while old ones do
not.
One of themost related paper is Bassetto (2008) that studies an OLGmodel where
consumers cooperatively Nash bargaining over public policies. Due to the direct
democracy feature, his model shows a political economic interaction: fiscal policy
affects capital accumulation of consumers and it changes the bargaining power bal-
ance in the next period. However, as he exogenously fixes the threat point, the model
cannot study the effect of status quo.
The other important paper is Piguillem and Riboni (2013) which studies a Neo-
classical growth model where exogenous “legislators” bargain over capital taxation
with endogenous threat point (status quo). In their model, the expected tax is in-
creasing in threat point due to its endogeneity. We show that this result is not robust
if the balance of bargaining power is endogenously formed.
According to our knowledge, this is the first paper to study the dynamic general
equilibrium model with both endogenous bargaining power and threat point.
2 The Model
The model is based on life-cycle overlapping generation model without private in-
formation. A new generation is born in each period and all of them live for two pe-
riods without bequest motives. Each consumer is indexed by generation g 2 {Y,O}
1There are numerous literature of the bargaining game. See, for example Rubinstein (1982), Baron
and Ferejohn (1989), and Baron (1996).
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Figure 1: Timing of Events within per Period
where Y denotes young;O denotes old, and intra-generational share of capital hold-
ings i. Young consumers are endowed identical amount of wage w and unequal cap-
ital ky,i. We suppose that the distribution of ky,i: f (ky,i) is exogenously fixed across
periods.
Technology and Redistribution Rule. The private good is produced by a technol-
ogy using aggregate capital stock Kt and aggregate labor supply Lt. We assume that
the total population Nt and aggregate labor supply L are constant: Nt = N for all
t; L = N2 . We also assume that capital fully depreciates after each use because the
length of per period equals per generation. The aggregate technology is represented
by a linear technology in which factor prices (R,w) are exogenously given
F (Kt, Lt) = RKt + wL. (1)
The revenue from capital tax is used to finance a commonly distributed lump-sum
rebate Tt
Tt =
ttRKt
N
. (2)
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Preferences. In period t, a young consumer endowed ky,it has a preference described
by
u
⇣
cy,it
⌘
+ bEt
h
u
⇣
co,it+1
⌘i
(3)
where cy,it and c
o,i
t+1 are consumption when he is young and old and b is the dis-
count factor. He faces budget constraints at date t and t+ 1
cy,it + k
o,i
t+1  w+ (1  tt) Rky,it + Tt (4)
co,it+1  (1  tt+1) Rko,it+1 + Tt+1 (5)
where Rt is the gross rate of return to capital, tt is the capital tax rate, and Tt is
equally distributed lump-sum rebate. Consumers are uncertain for tt+1. The expec-
tation for tt+1 evolves following Markov process
G(t|tQ) = G
0BB@
p(t0|t0) · · · p(t0|t1)
... . . .
...
p(t1|t0) · · · p(t1|t1)
1CCA , (6)
where tQ is the tax in the prior period: status-quo; p (tm|tn) = Prob  t = tm|tQ = tn .
The next period aggregate capital Kt+1, which affects the expectation for the next pe-
riod lump-sum rebate Tt+1, is given by the law of motion of aggregate capital
Kt+1 = g(Kt(tt 1)). (7)
Old agents just consume all of their disposable income. In period t, an old consumer
with capital share i has preferences described by
u
⇣
co,it
⌘
. (8)
He / she maximizes his / her utility (8) subject to the budget constraints
co,it  (1  tt) Rko,it + Tt. (9)
Legislature. In each period, one of the consumers is randomly elected to be agenda
setter who proposes take-it-or-leave-it offer for current tax t. Then, all consumers
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cast a vote “Yes” or “No”, if the majority acceptes it, it becomes the current tax, oth-
erwise the status quo will be implemented again. Consumers vote for the proposal
tA when it provide higher (expected) utility than the status quo. The voting rule f
for consumer g, i is described by
fg,i(tA|tQ) =
8<: ”Yes” i f Vg,i
 
tA
    Vg,i  tQ 
”No” otherwise
(10)
where Vg,i is her value function given tax tA of tQ. We let FYes
 
tA|tQ  and
FNo(tA|tQ) denote the share of consumers to total population who support and
who don’t. Then, the majority rule implies that the proposal will be accepted if and
only if
FYes(tA|tQ)   FNo
⇣
tA|tQ
⌘
. (11)
An agenda setter g, i proposes a current tax tA,g,i(tQ) to maximize his inter-temporal
utility
argmax
t
Vg,i(t|tQ), (12)
subject to the Markov process (6) and the majority rule constraints (11). Also, an
optimal tax for each agent t⇤g,i(tQ) is easily delivered by the expression (12) subject
to the Markov process (6). Note that the Markov process (6) is not bindnding for old
agenda setters because the next period tax does not affect their utilities.
All agents know which tax will be accepted. Therefore, if there exist a policy
which increases his expected utility andmajority of agents will accept it, he proposes
the policy, otherwise he proposes the status quo. We letFA
 
tA|tQ  denote the share
of consumers who propose tax tA if she become agenda setter and with status-quo
tQ. Then, the
 
tA, tQ
 
element of G (t|q) : p  tA|tQ  is
p
⇣
tA|tQ
⌘
= FA
⇣
tA|tQ
⌘
. (13)
Definition: Politico-economic Equilibrium. For given factor prices {w,R} and the
wealth distribution of young f
 
ky,i
 
, a Politico-economic Equilibrium is a stochastic se-
quence of redistribution policies {Tt, tt}•t=0, allocations {cg,it , kg,it }•t=0 for all g and i, the
law of motion of aggregate capital g(Kt(tt 1)), and the wealth distribution of old agents’
f
⇣
ko,it (tt 1)
⌘
for all t such that:
1. Value functions are generated by consumers’ optimal decisions.
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2. The law of motion of aggregate capital g(Kt(tt 1)) wealth distribution of old con-
sumers f
⇣
ko,it (tt 1)
⌘
are stationary.
3. The sequence of policies is generated by the Markov process for taxes G
 
t|tQ  and the
government’s budget constraint.
4. Markets clear: Âg Âi c
g,i
t +Âi k
o,i
t+1 = F (Kt, Lt) , f or all t.
5. Given the optimal decisions,
(a) Decision shall be taken by a majority given by the majority rule constraints (11) .
(b) The tax proposal is delivered by the expression (12) subject to the Markov process
(6) and the majority rule constraints (11).
(c) The Markov process for tax is generated by equation (13).
Table 1: Parameter Values
Parameter Description Value
u(c) Utility Function log c
b Discount Rate 0.6355 ⇡ 0.98530
w Wage 1
R Rental Cost of Capital 5.743 ⇡ 1.0630
Ng Population of each Generation 100
f (ky,i) Wealth Distribution of Young
Inter Uniform
Inter and Intra Wealth distribution in the US in 2010.
Calibration. The calibrated parameters are described in Table 1. The length of pe-
riod is assumed to be 30 years. In the first experimental case Inter, all young con-
sumers are endowed same level of wealth. In the case of Inter and Intra, following
Piketty (2014), we divided a generation to 4 groups: (1) Super Rich (top1% whose ky,i
is 35% of Ky), (2) Rich (top2-10%: ky,i is 35% of kY), (3) Middle (top 11-50%, ky,i is 25
% of Ky), and (4) Poor (bottom 50%, ky,i is 5% of Ky). Essentially, we divide the one
generation into the four types of consumers with different share of population.2
2The detailed calculation and computational algorithm are discussed in the online appendix
<https://sites.google.com/site/yutasaitoecon/>.
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Table 2: Equilibrium Political Outcomes: “Inter” Economy
Markov
G
 
t|tQ 
0@ 0.5 0.5 0.50 0 0
0.5 0.5 0.5
1A
Expected Tax
E
⇥
t|tQ⇤
 
0.5 0.5 0.5
 
Young Old
Votes
FYes(t|tQ)
0@ 100 0 0100 100 0
100 100 100
1A 0@ 100 100 1000 100 100
0 0 100
1A
Preferred Tax
t⇤(tQ)
 
H H H
   
L L L
 
Proposed Tax
tA(tQ)
 
H H H
   
L L L
 
Note: The order of the matrixes and vectors are: L,M,H.
3 Results
Table 2 shows the equilibrium result of Inter case where there exists only intergen-
erational heterogeneity. From now on, we show that the result of the case where
capital tax takes only three values: L = 0.0, M = 0.5, and H = 1.03. The equi-
librium Markov process shows “bang-bang” result: the tax will randomly be H or L
with any status quo. This is because both generations have majority so every agenda
setter proposes their most preferred tax.
The result is much different in the case with both intra and inter-generational
inequality called Inter and Intra(Table 3). As no types of consumers have major-
ity, all of them need support from the other consumers. Several agenda setters ,
whose t ⇤ (tQ) and tA(tQ) are different, propose their second-best policy because
they know their first-best will be rejected. The equilibrium Markov shows that the
expected tax is increasing in status quo when tQ is smaller than H as studied in
Piguillem and Riboni (2013). However, when tQ is H, the expected tax dramatically
declines, because themiddle and poor old consumers prefer Lwhowere perfectly re-
distributed when they were young. In our calibrated economy, ko,p(H) is larger than
average capital holdings, so they prefer L. This effect is caused by the endogeneity
3The fundamental insights are robust in the case with more smaller grids. See the online Appendix
in more detail.
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Table 3: Equilibrium Political Outcomes: “Inter and Intra” Economy
of the bargaining power and it has never been seen in the model with exogenous
legislators.
Figure 2 shows that the effect of taxation to the economy is heavily depends on
the expectation of the next period tax. In addition to the two equilibria, we add
Full-commitment case where Inter economy with fixed Markov process: G (t|q) =0B@ 1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1
1CAwhich can be interrupted as the standard life-cycle OLGmodel. In this
case, high current capital tax induces high amount of current consumption for young
because accumulated wealth is perfectly taxed in the next period. However, in the
case of Intra and Inter, high current tax makes the people to expect lower future tax,
so the consumption will decrease.
“Social Welfare” in Figure 2 shows the effect on the utilitarian social welfare:
Âi Vy,i
 
t|tQ  + Âi Vo,i(t|tQ). In the case of Full-commitment, the tax H decreases
the social welfare because the young consume all of their disposable income today
which significantly decreases the utility in the next period. In Inter case, tax H in-
creases the young’s utility through the increase of their disposable income and it is
larger than the utility decrease of olds. In the case of Intra and Inter, this effect is
larger because the marginal utility benefit of poor agents is much higher.
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Figure 2: Effect of Taxation to Economy (Y label: % increase of the variable from the t = L
case)
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Note: This figure shows the case where tQ = L .
4 Conclusion
We studied an OLG model with legislative bargain process which illustrates how
inequality, bargaining power and threat point affect the policy and economy in some
broader perspective.
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